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Abstract 
 
With countries from around the world set to meet in Copenhagen to try to hammer out a 
post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a U.S. commitment to 
cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact. However, despite U.S. 
president Obama’s recent announcement that he will push for a commitment to cut U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is questionable whether U.S. 
Congress will agree to specific emissions cuts, although are not ambitious at all from the 
perspectives of both the EU and developing countries, without imposing carbon tariffs on 
Chinese products to the U.S. market, even given China’s own recent announcement to 
voluntarily seek to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% over the same period.  
 
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, 
which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates of 2020 and 2050. 
However, if the international climate change negotiations continue their current course 
                                                 
1 Prepared for International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, Special Issue 
(Guest Edited by Raimund Bleischwitz, Paul Welfens and ZhongXiang Zhang) on 
International Economics of Resources and Resource Policy. 
without extending the commitment period to 2030, which would really open the 
possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the 
other side, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures seems essential to secure 
passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the joint 
WTO-UNEP report indicates that border carbon adjustment measures might be allowed 
under the existing WTO rules, depending on specific design features.  
 
Against this background, this paper argues that, on the U.S. side, there is a need to 
minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon 
adjustment measures. The U.S. also needs to explore with its trading partners cooperative 
sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation 
efforts in a given sector at an international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a 
successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, 1) 
there should be a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries 
concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) WTO consistency also requires 
considering alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill 
the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO 
provisions; and 3) trade provisions should allow importers to submit equivalent emission 
reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents 
of imported products.  
 
Meanwhile, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to, 
at a right time, indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to 
challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs by signaling well ahead 
that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030, and needs the 
three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute 
emissions caps. The paper argues that there is a clear need within a climate regime to 
define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use 
of unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs 
that China applied on its own during 2006-08, the paper shows that defining the 
comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage. Furthermore, given the fact 
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that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7-8 times that of 
India, and thus carbon tariffs impact much more on China than on India, the paper 
questions whether China should hold the same stance on this issue as India as it does now, 
although the two largest developing countries should continue to take the same positions 
on other key issues in international climate change negotiations.    
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I. Introduction 
 
There is a growing consensus that climate change has the potential to seriously damage 
our natural environment and affect the global economy and thus represents the world’s 
most pressing long-term threat to future prosperity and security. With greenhouse gas 
emissions embodied in virtually all products produced and traded in every conceivable 
economic sector, effectively addressing climate change will require a fundamental 
transformation of our economy and the ways energy is produced and used. This will 
certainly have a bearing on world trade because it will affect the costs of production of 
traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world market. This 
climate-trade nexus has become the focus of an academic debate (e.g., Bhagwati and 
Mavroidis, 2007; Charnovitz, 2003; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Swedish National Board 
of Trade, 2004; The World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 1998, 2004 and 2007a; Zhang and 
Assunção, 2004), and gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol and forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed it. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calls for developed countries to cut their 
greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% by 2020 and by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 
levels, in order to avoid dangerous climate change impacts. In the meantime, under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities”, developing countries are allowed to move 
different speeds as do their developed counterparts. This principle is clearly reflected in 
the Bali roadmap, which requires developing countries to take “nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions … in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled 
by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner”. Understandably, the U.S. and other industrialized countries would 
like to see developing countries, in particular large developing economies, go beyond that 
because of concerns about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas 
emissions in developing countries. They are considering unilateral trade measures to 
“induce” developing countries to do so. This has been a case in the course of debating 
and voting the U.S. congressional climate bills capping U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. 
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U.S. legislators have pushed for major emerging economies, such as China and India, and 
require these countries to take comparable climate actions as U.S. does. Otherwise, their 
products sold on the U.S. market will have to purchase and surrender emissions 
allowances to cover their carbon contents. This kind of border carbon adjustment 
measures has raised great concerns about whether they are WTO-consistent and has 
received heavy criticisms from developing countries. 
 
To date, border adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements 
(EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral 
trade measure put forward on the table to level the carbon playing field. If improperly 
implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger trade war. 
Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper will focus on this type of 
unilateral border adjustment. It requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions 
allowances corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries 
that have not taken climate actions comparable to that of home country. Our discussion is 
mainly on the legality of unilateral EAR under the WTO rules.2 Section 2 briefly 
describes the border carbon adjustment measures proposed in the U.S. legislations. 
Section 3 deals with the WTO scrutiny of EAR proposed in the U.S. congressional 
climate bills and methodological challenges in implementing EAR. With current 
international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the two 
targeted dates of 2020 and 2050, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures 
seems essential to secure passage of any U.S. climate legislation. Given this, Section 4 
discuses how China should respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs. The paper ends 
with some concluding remarks on the needs on the U.S. side to minimize the potential 
conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon adjustment measures, 
and with suggestion for China being targeted by such border measures to effectively deal 
with the proposed border adjustment measures to its advantage. 
 
                                                 
2 See Reinaud (2008) for an excellent review of practical issues involved in implementing 
unilateral EAR.  
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2. Proposed border adjustment measures in the U.S. legislations 
 
The notion of border carbon adjustments (BCA) is not an American invention. The idea 
of using BCA to address the competitiveness concerns as a result of differing climate 
policy was first floated in the EU, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol. Dominique de Villepin, the then French prime minister, proposed in November 
2006 for carbon tariffs on goods from countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
He clearly had the U.S. in mind when contemplating such proposals aimed to get the U.S. 
to the table of climate negotiations. However, Peter Mandelson, the then EU trade 
commissioner dismissed the French proposal as not only a probable breach of trade rules 
but also “not good politics” (Bounds, 2006). As a balanced reflection of the divergent 
views on this issue, the European Commission has suggested that it could implement a 
“carbon equalization system … with a view to putting EU and non-EU producers on a 
comparable footing”. “Such a system could apply to importers of goods requirements 
similar to those applicable to installations within the European Union, by requiring the 
surrender of allowances.” (European Commission, 2008). In light of this, various 
proposals about carbon equalization systems at the border have been put forward, the 
most recent one linked to French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposal for “a carbon tax 
at the borders of Europe”. France will become the largest economy to levy a carbon tax at 
€17 per ton of CO2 emissions, which will take into effect in 2010. The president Sarkozy 
renewed such a call for a European carbon tax on imports when unveiling the details of 
France’s controversial national carbon tax. He defended his position by citing comments 
from the WTO that such a tax could be compatible with its rules and referring to a similar 
border carbon adjustment provision under the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S. House to 
be discussed in the next three sections, arguing that “I don’t see why the US can do it and 
Europe cannot” (Hollinger, 2009). So far, while the EU has considered the possibility of 
imposing a border allowance adjustment should serious leakage issues arise in the future, 
it has put this option on hold at least until 2012. The European Commission has proposed 
using temporary free allocations to address competitiveness concerns in the interim. Its 
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aim is to facilitate a post-2012 climate negotiation while keeping that option in the 
background as a last resort.  
 
Interestingly, the U.S. legislators not only have embraced such BCA measures that they 
used to oppose, but also have focused on their design issues in more details. In the U.S. 
Senate, the Boxer Substitute of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 3036) 
mandates that starting from 2014 importers of products covered by the cap-and-trade 
scheme would have to purchase emissions allowances from an International Reserve 
Allowance Programme if no comparable climate action were taken in the exporting 
country. Least developed countries and countries that emit less than 0.5% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., those being considered not significant emitters) would be 
excluded from the scheme. Given that most carbon-intensive industries in the U.S. run a 
substantial trade deficit (Houser et al., 2008), this proposed EAR clearly aims to level the 
carbon playing field for domestic producers and importers. In the U.S. House of 
Representatives, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2998),3 
sponsored by Reps. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) and Edward Markey (D-Mass.), was 
narrowly passed on June 26, 2009. The so-called Waxman-Markey bill sets up an 
“International Reserve Allowance Program” whereby U.S. importers of primary 
emission-intensive products from countries having not taken “greenhouse gas compliance 
obligations commensurate with those that would apply in the United States” would be 
required to acquire and surrender carbon emissions allowances. The EU by any definition 
would pass this comparability test, because it has taken under the Kyoto Protocol and is 
going to take in its follow-up regime much more ambitious climate targets than U.S.. 
Because all other remaining Annex 1 countries but the U.S. have accepted mandatory 
emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, these countries would likely pass the 
comparability test as well, which exempts them from EAR under U.S. cap-and-trade 
regime. While France targeted the American goods, the U.S. EAR clearly targets major 
emerging economies, such as China and India. 
 
                                                 
3 H.R. 2998, available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2998ih.txt.pdf. 
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3. WTO scrutiny of U.S. Congressional climate bills 
 
 
The import emissions allowance requirement was a key part of the Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Security Act of 2008, and will re-appear again as the U.S. Senate debates and 
votes its own version of a climate change bill next year after the U.S. House of 
Representatives narrowly passed the Waxman-Markey bill. Moreover, concerns raised in 
the Lieberman-Warner bill seem to have provided references to writing relevant 
provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill to deal with the competitiveness concerns. For 
these reasons, I start with the Lieberman-Warner bill.  
 
A proposal first introduced by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) and American Electric Power (AEP) in early 2007 would require importers to 
acquire emission allowances to cover the carbon content of certain products from 
countries that do not take climate actions comparable to that of the U.S. (Morris and Hill, 
2007). The original version of the Lieberman-Warner bill incorporated this mechanism, 
threatening to punish energy-intensive imports from developing countries by requiring 
importers to obtain emission allowance, but only if they had not taken comparable actions 
by 2020, eight years after the effective start date of a U.S. cap-and-trade regime begins. It 
was argued that the inclusion of trade provisions would give the U.S. additional 
diplomatic leverage to negotiate multilaterally and bilaterally with other countries on 
comparable climate actions. Should such negotiations not succeed, such trade provisions 
would provide a means of leveling the carbon playing field between American energy-
intensive manufacturers and their competitors in countries not taking comparable climate 
actions. Not only would the bill have imposed an import allowance purchase requirement 
too quickly, it would have also dramatically expanded the scope of punishment: almost 
any manufactured product would potentially have qualified. If strictly implemented, such 
a provision would pose an insurmountable hurdle for developing countries (The 
Economist, 2008).  
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It should be emphasized that the aim of including trade provisions is to facilitate 
negotiations while keeping open the possibility of invoking trade measures as a last resort. 
The latest version of the Lieberman-Warner bill has brought the deadline forward to 2014 
to gain business and union backing.4 The inclusion of trade provisions might be 
considered the “price” of passage for any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Put another way, it is likely that no climate legislation can move through U.S. 
Congress without dealing with the issue of trade provisions. An important issue on the 
table is the length of the grace period to be granted to developing countries. While many 
factors need to be taken into consideration here (Haverkamp, 2008), further bringing 
forward the imposition of allowance requirements to imports is rather unrealistic, given 
the already very short grace period ending 2019 in its original version. It should be 
noticed that the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer grants 
developing countries a grace period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the scope of 
economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger 
than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, if legislation incorporates border adjustment 
measures (put the issue of their WTO consistency aside), in my view, they should not be 
invoked at least 10 years after mandatory U.S. emission targets take effect.  
 
Moreover, unrealistically shortening the grace period granted before resorting to the trade 
provisions would increase uncertainty of whether the measure would withstand a 
challenge by U.S. trading partners before the WTO. As the ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle 
dispute indicates (see Box 2), for a trade measure to be considered WTO-consistent, a 
period of good-faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned is needed 
before imposing such trade measures. Put another way, trade provisions should be 
preceded by major efforts to negotiate with partners within a reasonable timeframe. 
Furthermore, developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate national 
climate policies and measures. Take the establishment of an emissions trading scheme as 
a case in point. Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire process 
                                                 
4 This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires U.S. importers to submit 
allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods two 
years after U.S. starts its trade-and-cap program (McBroom, 2008).  
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from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data for its 
allocation database in 1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March 2003 
took almost four years. For the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the 
entire process took almost two years from the EU publishing the Directive establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading on 23 July 2003 to it approving 
the last national allocation plan for Greece on 20 June 2005. For developing countries 
with very weak environmental institutions and that do not have dependable data on 
emissions, fuel uses and outputs for installations, this allocation process is expected to 
take much longer than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU (Zhang, 2007b). 
 
 
Box 1  Core WTO principles  
 
GATT Article 1 (‘most favored nation’ treatment): WTO members not allowed to 
discriminate against like imported products from other WTO members 
 
GATT Article III (‘national treatment’): Domestic and like imported products treated 
identically, including any internal taxes and regulations 
 
GATT Article XI (‘elimination of quantitative restrictions’): Forbids any restrictions (on 
other WTO members) in the form of bans, quotas or licenses 
 
GATT Article XX 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be constructed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures… 
    (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; … 
    (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; ...”  
 
The threshold for (b) is higher than for (g), because, in order to fall under (b), the 
measure must be “necessary”, rather than merely “relating to” under (g). 
 
 
 
Box 2  Implications of the findings of WTO the shrimp-turtle dispute 
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To address the decline of sea turtles around the world, in 1989 the U.S. Congress enacted 
Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 to authorize embargoes on shrimp harvested with 
commercial fishing technology harmful to sea turtles. The U.S. was challenged in the 
WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand in October 1996, after embargoes were 
leveled against them. The four governments challenged this measure, asserting that the 
U.S. could not apply its laws to foreign process and production methods. A WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel was established in April 1997 to hear the case. The Panel found that the 
U.S. failed to approach the complainant nations in serious multilateral negotiations before 
enforcing the U.S. law against those nations. The Panel held that the U.S. shrimp 
embargo was a class of measures of processes-and-production-methods type and had a 
serious threat to the multilateral trading system because it conditioned market access on 
the conservation policies of foreign countries. Thus, it cannot be justified under GATT 
Article XX. However, the WTO Appellate Body overruled the Panel’s reasoning. The 
Appellate Body held that a WTO member requires from exporting countries compliance, 
or adoption of, certain policies prescribed by the importing country does not render the 
measure inconsistent with the WTO obligation. Although the Appellate Body still found 
that the U.S. shrimp embargo was not justified under GATT Article XX, the decision was 
not on ground that the U.S. sea turtle law itself was not inconsistent with GATT. Rather, 
the ruling was on ground that the application of the law constituted “arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination” between WTO members (WTO, 1998). The WTO Appellate 
Body pointed to a 1996 regional agreement reached at the U.S. initiation, namely the 
Inter-American Convention on Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, as evidence 
of the feasibility of such an approach (WTO, 1998; Berger, 1999). Here, the Appellate 
Body again advanced the standing of multilateral environmental treaties (Zhang, 2004; 
Zhang and Assunção, 2004). Thus, it follows that this trade dispute under the WTO may 
have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to multilateral 
agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol and its successor. However, this interpretation should be with great caution, 
because there is no doctrine of stare decisis (namely, “to stand by things decided”) in the 
WTO; the GATT/WTO panels are not bound by previous panel decisions (Zhang and 
Assunção, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute settlement has a bearing on the ongoing 
discussion on the “comparability” of climate actions in a post-2012 climate change 
regime. The Appellate Body found that when the U.S. shifted its standard from requiring 
measures essentially the same as the U.S. measures to “the adoption of a program 
comparable in effectiveness”, this new standard would comply with the WTO disciplines 
(WTO, 2001, paragraph 144). Some may view that this case opens the door for U.S. 
climate legislation that bases trade measures on an evaluation of the comparability of 
climate actions taken by other trading countries. Comparable action can be interpreted as 
meaning action comparable in effect as the “comparable in effectiveness” in the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute. It can also be interpreted as meaning “the comparability of efforts”. The 
Bali Action Plan adopts the latter interpretation, using the terms comparable as a means 
of ensuring that developed countries undertake commitments comparable to each other 
(Zhang, 2009a).   
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 In the case of a WTO dispute, the question will arise whether there are any alternatives to 
trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not 
inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. Take the GATT Thai 
cigarette dispute as a case in point. Under Section 27 of the Tobacco Act of 1966, 
Thailand restricted imports of cigarettes and imposed a higher tax rate on imported 
cigarettes when they were allowed on the three occasions since 1966, namely in 1968-70, 
1976 and 1980. After consultations with Thailand failed to lead to a solution, the U.S. 
requested in 1990 the Dispute Settlement Panel to rule on the Thai action on the grounds 
that it was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the General Agreement; was not justified by 
the exception under Article XI:2(c), because cigarettes were not an agricultural or 
fisheries product in the meaning of Article XI:1; and was not justified under Article 
XX(b) because the restrictions were not necessary to protect human health, i.e. 
controlling the consumption of cigarettes did not require an import ban. The Dispute 
Settlement Panel ruled against Thailand. The Panel found that Thailand had acted 
inconsistently with Article XI:1 for having not granted import licenses over a long period 
of time. Recognizing that XI:2(c) allows exceptions for fisheries and agricultural 
products if the restrictions are necessary to enable governments to protect farmers and 
fishermen who, because of the perishability of their produce, often could not withhold 
excess supplies of the fresh product from the market, the Panel found that cigarettes were 
not “like” the fresh product as leaf tobacco and thus were not among the products eligible 
for import restrictions under Article XI:2(c). Moreover, the Panel acknowledged that 
Article XX(b) allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade 
liberalization. The Panel held the view that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand 
could be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no 
alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, 
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy 
objectives. However, the Panel found the Thai import restriction measure not necessary 
because Thailand could reasonably be expected to take strict, non-discriminatory 
labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations and to ban all the direct and indirect 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship of cigarettes to ensure the quality and reduce the 
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quantity of cigarettes sold in Thailand. These alternative measures are considered WTO-
consistent to achieve the same health policy objectives as Thailand now pursues through 
an import ban on all cigarettes whatever their ingredients (GATT, 1990). Simply put, in 
the GATT Thai cigarette dispute, the Dispute Settlement Panel concluded that Thailand 
had legitimate concerns with health but it had measures available to it other than a trade 
ban that would be consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (e.g. bans 
on advertising) (GATT, 1990).  
 
Indeed, there are alternatives to resorting to trade provisions to protect the U.S. trade-
sensitive, energy-intensive industries during a period when the U.S. is taking good-faith 
efforts to negotiate with trading partners on comparable actions. One way to address 
competitiveness concerns is to initially allocate free emission allowances to those sectors 
vulnerable to global competition, either totally or partially.5 Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2002) found that giving out about 13% of the allowances to fossil fuel suppliers freely 
instead of auctioning in an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would be sufficient to 
prevent their profits with the emissions constraints from falling in comparison with those 
without the emissions constraints. 
 
There is no disagreement that the allocation of permits to emissions sources is a 
politically contentious issue. Grandfathering, at least partially grandfathering, helps these 
well-organized, politically highly-mobilized industries or sectors to save considerable 
expenditures and thus increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme, 
although it leads to a higher economic cost than a policy where the allowances are fully 
auctioned.6 That explains why the sponsors of the American Clean Energy and Security 
                                                 
5 To be consistent with the WTO provisions, foreign producers could arguably demand 
the same proportion of free allowances as U.S. domestic producers in case they are 
subject to border carbon adjustments.  
6 In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes, if allowances are 
auctioned, the revenues generated can then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary 
taxes, thus generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1999), for example, show that 
the costs of reducing U.S. carbon emissions by 10% in a second-best setting with pre-
existing labor taxes are five times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case 
than under an auctioned case. This is because the policy where the permits are auctioned 
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Act of 2009 had to make a compromise amending it to auction only 15% of the emission 
permits instead of the initial proposal for auctioning all the emission permits in a 
proposed cap-and-trade regime in order for it to pass the U.S. House of Representatives 
Energy and Commerce Committee in May 2009. However, it should be pointed out that 
although grandfathering is thought of as giving implicit subsidies to these sectors, 
grandfathering is less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes (Zhang, 
1998 and 1999), which means that partially grandfathering is even less trade-distorted 
than the exemptions from carbon taxes. To understand their difference, it is important to 
bear in mind that grandfathering itself also implies an opportunity cost for firms receiving 
permits: what matters here is not how firms get your permits, but what firms can sell 
them for - that is what determines opportunity cost. Thus, even if permits are awarded 
gratis, firms will value them at their market price. Accordingly, the prices of energy will 
adjust to reflect the increased scarcity of fossil fuels. This means that regardless of 
whether emissions permits are given out freely or are auctioned by the government, the 
effects on energy prices are expected to be the same, although the initial ownership of 
emissions permits differs among different allocation methods. As a result, relative prices 
of products will not be distorted relative to their pre-existing levels and switching of 
demands towards products of those firms whose permits are awarded gratis (the so-called 
substitution effect) will not be induced by grandfathering. This makes grandfathering 
different from the exemptions from carbon taxes. In the latter case, there exist 
substitution effects (Zhang, 1998 and 1999). For example, the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and energy tax7 provides for 
                                                                                                                                                 
raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary 
taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no 
revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same tax-
interaction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and 
investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang, 
1999). 
7 As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy 
efficiency, a carbon/energy tax has been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal is that 
member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993, 
rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the 
tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are allocated across 
fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (Zhang, 1997). 
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exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries (i.e., iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper) from coverage of the CEC tax on grounds 
of competitiveness. This not only reduces the effectiveness of the CEC tax in achieving 
its objective of reducing CO2 emissions, but also makes the industries, which are exempt 
from paying the CEC tax, improve their competitive position in relation to those 
industries which are not. Therefore, there will be some switching of demand towards the 
products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the reaction that such a 
tax should avoid (Zhang, 1997). 
 
The import allowance requirement approach would distinguish between two otherwise 
physically identical products on the basis of climate actions in place in the country of 
origin. This discrimination of like products among trading nations would constitute a 
prima facie violation of WTO rules. To pass WTO scrutiny of trade provisions, the U.S. 
is likely to make reference to the health and environmental exceptions provided under 
GATT Article XX (see Box 1). This Article itself is the exceptions that authorize 
governments to employ otherwise GATT-illegal measures when such measures are 
necessary to deal with certain enumerated public policy problems. The GATT panel in 
Tuna/Dolphin II concluded that Article XX does not preclude governments from 
pursuing environmental concerns outside their national territory, but such extra-
jurisdictional application of domestic laws would be permitted only if aimed primarily 
(emphasis added) at having a conservation or protection effect (GATT, 1994; Zhang, 
1998). The capacity of the planet’s atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gas emissions 
without adverse impacts is an ‘exhaustible natural resource’. Thus, if countries take 
measures on their own including extra-jurisdictional application primarily to prevent the 
depletion of this ‘exhaustible natural resource’, such measures will have a good 
justification under GATT Article XX. Along this reasoning, if the main objective of trade 
provisions is to protect the environment by requiring other countries to take actions 
comparable to that of the U.S., then mandating importers to purchase allowances from the 
designated special international reserve allowance pool to cover the carbon emissions 
associated with the manufacture of that product is debatable. To increase the prospects 
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for a successful WTO defense, I think that trade provisions can refer to the designated 
special international reserve allowance pool, but may not do without adding “or 
equivalent”. This will allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that 
are not necessarily allowances but are recognized by international treaties to cover the 
carbon contents of imported products. 
 
Clearly, these concerns raised in the Lieberman-Warner bill have shaped relevant 
provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill to deal with the competitiveness and leakage 
concerns. Accordingly, the Waxman-Markey bill has avoided all the aforementioned 
controversies raised in the Lieberman-Warner bill. Unlike the EAR in the Lieberman-
Warner bill which focuses exclusively on imports into the U.S., but does nothing to 
address the competitiveness of U.S. exports in foreign markets, the Waxman-Markey bill 
included both rebates for few energy-intensive, trade-sensitive sectors8 and free emission 
allowances to help not to put U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage relative to overseas 
competitors. Unlike the Lieberman-Warner bill in the U.S. Senate, the Waxman-Markey 
bill also gives China, India and other major developing nations time to enact their 
climate-friendly measures. Under the Waxman-Markey bill, the International Reserve 
Allowance Program may not begin before January 1, 2025. The U.S. President may only 
implement an International Reserve Allowance Program for sectors producing primary 
products. While the bill called for a “carbon tariff” on imports, it very much framed that 
measures as a last resort that a U.S. president could impose at his or her discretion 
regarding border adjustments or tariffs. However, in the middle of the night before the 
vote on June 26, 2009, a provision was inserted in this House bill that requires the 
President, starting in 2020, to impose a border adjustment - or tariffs - on certain goods 
from countries that do not act to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. The President can 
waive the tariffs only if he receives explicit permission from U.S. Congress (Broder, 
2009). The last-minute changes in the bill changed a Presidential long-term back-up 
option to a requirement that the President put such tariffs in place under the specified 
conditions. Such changes significantly changed the spirit of the bill, moving it 
                                                 
8 See Genasci (2008) for discussion on complicating issues related to how to rebate 
exports under a cap-and-trade regime. 
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considerably closer to risky protectionism. While praising the passage of the House bill 
as an “extraordinary first step,” President Obama opposed to a trade provision in that 
bill.9 The carbon tariff proposals have also drawn fierce criticism from China and India. 
Without specific reference to the U.S. or the Waxman-Markey bill, China’s Ministry of 
Commerce said in a statement posted on its website that proposals to impose “carbon 
tariffs” on imported products will violate the rules of the World Trade Organization. That 
would enable developed countries to “resort to trade in the name of protecting the 
environment”. The carbon tariff proposal runs against the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol. This will neither help 
strengthen confidence that the international community can cooperate to handle the 
(economic) crisis, nor helps any country’s endeavors during the climate change 
negotiations. Thus China is strongly opposed to it (MOC of China, 2009).  
 
On September 30, 2009, Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) 
introduced the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733), the Senate version 
of the Waxman-Markey bill in the House. Unlike in the House where a simple majority is 
needed to pass a legislation, the Senate needs 60 votes from its 100 members to ensure 
passage. With two senators per state no matter how small, coal-producing, industrial and 
agricultural states are more heavily represented in the Senate than in the House. Thus the 
Kerry-Boxer bill faces an even uphill battle in the Senate. As would be expected, senators 
from those states would push for even tough border carbon adjustment provisions that 
would potentially tax foreign goods at a higher rate if they come from countries that are 
not taking steps comparable to that of the U.S., which can add to the cost of goods. At 
this stage the bill does propose to include some form of BCAs, but details still need to be 
worked out. While Senator Kerry indicates that the proposed provision would comply 
with the WTO rules, it remains to be seen how the bill, which is put off until Spring 2010 
(Talley, 2009), is going to reconcile potential conflicts between demands for tough border 
                                                 
9 President Obama was quoted as saying that “At a time when the economy worldwide is 
still deep in recession and we’ve seen a significant drop in global trade, I think we have 
to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there. I think there may be 
other ways of doing it than with a tariff approach.” (Broder, 2009). 
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carbon adjustment provisions from coal-producing, industrial and agricultural states and 
the U.S. international obligations. 
 
Besides the issue of WTO consistency, there will be methodological challenges in 
implementing an EAR under a cap-and-trade regime, although such practical 
implementation issues are secondary concerns. Identifying the appropriate carbon contents 
embodied in traded products will present formidable technical difficulties, given the wide 
range of technologies in use around the world and very different energy resource 
endowments and consumption patterns among countries. In the absence of any information 
regarding the carbon content of the products from exporting countries, importing countries, 
the U.S. in this case, could adopt either of the two approaches to overcoming information 
challenge in practical implementation. One is to prescribe the tax rates for the imported 
product based on U.S. domestically predominant method of production for a like product, 
which sets the average embedded carbon content of a particular product (Zhang, 1998; 
Zhang and Assunção, 2004). This practice is by no means without foundation. For 
example, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has adopted the approach in the tax on 
imported toxic chemicals under the Superfund Tax (GATT, 1987; Zhang, 1998). 
Alternative is to set the best available technology (BAT) as the reference technology 
level and then use the average embedded carbon content of a particular product produced 
with the BAT in applying border carbon adjustments (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). 
Generally speaking, developing countries will bear a lower cost based on either of the 
approaches than using the nation-wide average carbon content of imported products for the 
country of origin, given that less energy-efficient technologies in developing countries 
produce products of higher embedded carbon contends than those like products produced 
by more energy-efficient technologies in the U.S. However, to be more defensible, either 
of the approaches should allow foreign producers to challenge the carbon contents 
applied to their products to ensure that they will not pay for more than they have actually 
emitted. 
  
 
4. How should China respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs? 
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 So far, the discussion has been focused on the country that is considering unilateral trade 
measures. Now that the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures is widely 
considered essential to secure passage of any U.S. climate legislation, the question is then 
how China should respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs.  
 
4.1 A serious commitment to find a global solution to the threat of climate change 
 
First of all, China needs to creditably indicate a serious commitment to address climate 
change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs. Indeed, 
if China’s energy use and the resulting carbon emissions had followed their trends 
between 1980 and 2000, during which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP with 
only a doubling of energy consumption, rather than surged since 2001, then the position 
of China in the international climate debate would be very different from what it is today. 
On the trends of the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2004) estimated that China’s CO2 emissions are not expected to catch up with the world’s 
largest carbon emitter by 2030. However, China’s energy use had surged since the turn of 
this century, almost doubling between 2000 and 2007. Despite similar rates of economic 
growth, the rate of growth in China’s energy use during this period (9.74% per year) has 
been more than twice that of the last two decades in the past century (4.25% per year) 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). As a result, China was already the world’s 
largest carbon emitter in 2007, instead of “until 2030” as estimated as late as 2004.  
 
It is conceivable that China will argue that its high absolute emission levels are the 
combined effects of large population and coal-fueled economy and the workshop as the 
world, the latter of which leads to a hefty chunk of China’s emissions embedded in goods 
that are exported to industrialized countries (Zhang, 2009c). China’s arguments are 
legitimate. The country has every right to do that. Anyhow, China’s share of the world’s 
cumulative energy-related CO2 emissions was only 8% from 1900 to 2005, far less than 
30% for the U.S., and is still lower than those for the U.S. by 2030. On a per capita basis, 
China’s CO2 emissions are currently only one-fifth of that for the U.S., and are still less 
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than half of that of the U.S. by 2030 (IEA, 2007). However, the number one position has 
put China in the spotlight, just at a time when the world’s community starts negotiating a 
post-Kyoto climate regime under the Bali Roadmap. There are the renewed interests in 
and debates on China’s role in combating global climate change. 
 
Given the fact that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter and its emissions 
continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization, China is seen 
with greater capacity, capability and responsibility. The country is facing great pressure 
both inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition. As 
long as China does not signal well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps, 
it will always be confronted with the threats of trade measures. In responses to these 
concerns and to put China in a positive position, I propose that China take as its 
negotiation position for Copenhagen and beyond requiring greenhouse gas emissions in 
industrialized countries to be cut at least by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels and 
per capita emissions for all countries by 2050 no more than the world’s average at that 
time. Moreover, it would be in China’s own best interest if, at a right time (e.g., at a time 
when the U.S. Senate is going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge 
from Copenhagen or later), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute 
emission caps around the year 2030.  
 
4.1.1 Why around 2030 for timing China’s absolute emissions caps? 
 
Many factors need to be taken into consideration in determining the timing for China to 
take on absolute emissions caps. Assuming the commitment period of five years as the 
Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I think the fifth commitment period (2028-2032), or around 
2030 is not an unreasonably expected date on which China needs to take on absolute 
emissions caps for the following reasons. While this date is later than the time frame that 
the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see, it would probably be still too 
soon from China’s perspective. 
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First, the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
recommends that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by 2020 as the latest and 
then turn downward, to avoid dangerous climate change consequences. With China 
already the world’s largest carbon emitter, the earlier China takes on emissions caps, the 
more likely that goal can be achieved. However, given China’s relatively low 
development stage and its rapidly growing economy fueled by coal, its carbon emissions 
are still on the climbing trajectories well beyond 2030, even if some energy saving 
policies and measures have been factored into such projections.  
 
Second, before legally binding commitments become applicable to Annex I 
(industrialized) countries, they have a grace period of 16 years starting from the Earth 
Summit in June 1992 when Annex I countries promised to individually or jointly stabilize 
greenhouse gases emissions at their 1990 levels by the end of the past century to the 
beginning of the first commitment period in 2008. This precedent points to a first binding 
commitment period for China starting around 2026.  
 
Third, with China still dependent on coal to meet the bulk of its energy needs for the next 
several decades, the commercialization and widespread deployment of carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) is a crucial option for reducing both China’s and global CO2 emissions. 
Thus far, CCS has not been commercialized anywhere in the world, and it is unlikely, 
given current trends, that this technology will find large-scale application either in China 
or elsewhere before 2030. Until CCS projects are developed to the point of achieving 
economies of scale and bringing down the costs, China will not feel confident about 
committing to absolute emissions caps.  
 
Fourth, developing countries need reasonable time to develop and operate national 
climate policies and measures. This is understood by knowledgeable U.S. politicians, 
such as Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-MA), the sponsors of the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Indeed, the Waxman-Markey bill 
gives China, India and other major developing nations time to enact climate-friendly 
measures. While the bill called for a “carbon tariff” on imports, it very much framed that 
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measures as a last resort that a U.S. president could impose at his or her discretion not 
until January 1, 2025 regarding border adjustments or tariffs, although in the middle of 
the night before the vote on June 26, 2009, a compromise was made to further bring 
forward the imposition of carbon tariffs. 
 
Fifth, another timing indicator is a lag between the date that a treaty is signed and the 
starting date of the budget period. With the Kyoto Protocol signing in December 1997 
and the first budget period staring 2008, the earliest date to expect China to introduce 
binding commitments would not be before 2020. Even without this precedent for Annex I 
countries, China’s demand is by no means without foundation. For example, the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer grants developing countries a grace 
period of 10 years (Zhang, 2000). Given that the scope of economic activities affected by 
a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger than those covered by the Montreal 
Protocol, it is arguable that developing countries should have a grace period much longer 
than 10 years, after mandatory emission targets for Annex I countries took effect in 2008.  
 
Sixth, while it is not unreasonable to grant China a grace period before taking on 
emissions caps, it would hardly acceptable to delay the timing beyond 2030. China is 
already the world’s largest carbon emitter and, in the next year or so, will overtake Japan 
as the world’s second largest economy, although its per capita income and emissions are 
still very low. After another twenty years of rapid development, China’s economy will 
approach that of the world’s second-largest emitter (the U.S.) in size, whereas China’s 
absolute emissions are well above those of number two. Its baseline carbon emissions in 
2030 are projected to reach 11.73 billion tons of carbon dioxide, relative to 6.4 billion 
tons for the U.S. and 2.1 billion tons for India (EIA, 2009), the world’s populous country 
at that time (UNDESA, 2009).10 This gap with the U.S. could be even bigger, provided 
that the U.S. would cut its emissions to the levels proposed by the Obama administration 
and under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. By then, China’s per 
                                                 
10 UNDESA (2009) projects that China’s population would peak at 1462.5 millions 
around 2030, while India’s population would be projected to be at 1484.6 millions in 
2030 and further grow to 1613.8 millions in 2050. 
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capita income will reach a very reasonable level, whereas its per capita emissions are 
projected to be well above the world’s average and about 5.7 times of India (EIA, 2009). 
While the country is still on the climbing trajectory of carbon emissions under the 
business as usual scenario, China will have lost ground by not to taking on emissions 
caps when the world is facing ever alarming climate change threats and developed 
countries will have achieved significant emissions reductions by then. 
 
4.1.2 Three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations 
 
It is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid 
emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several 
intermediate phases. After all, China is still a developing country right now, no matter 
how rapidly it is expected to grow in the future. Assuming the commitment period of five 
years as the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I envision that China needs the following three 
transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, before taking on absolute emissions 
caps. 
 
First, further credible energy-conservation commitments starting 2013 
China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the 
use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible 
quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period. Such 
commitments would include but are not limited to continuing to set energy-saving and 
pollutant control goals in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as 
challenging as the current 11th five-year blueprint does, increasing investment in energy 
conservation and improving energy efficiency, significantly scaling up the use of 
renewable energies and other low-carbon technologies, in particular wind power and 
nuclear power, and doubling or even quadrupling the current unit capacity below which 
thousands of small, inefficient coal-fired plants need to be decommissioned (Zhang, 
2009c). 
 
Second, voluntary “no lose” emissions targets starting 2018 
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During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission 
reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these “no lose” targets would 
then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of 
developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China 
currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism 
projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets. 
 
Third, binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 
2030 
While China is expected to adopt the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment in 
2011, China adopting binding carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international 
commitment would be a significant step towards committing to absolute emissions caps 
during the subsequent commitment period. At that juncture, having been granted three 
transition periods, China could then be expected to take on binding emissions caps, 
starting around 2030 and to aim for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 
2050.  
 
4.2 A clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards 
climate mitigation and adaptation 
 
While indicating, well in advance, that it will take on absolute emissions caps around the 
year 2030, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China should 
make the best use of the forums provided under the UNFCCC and its KP to effectively 
deal with the proposed measures to its advantage (Zhang, 2009b). However, China and 
other leading developing countries appear to be comfortable with WTO rules and 
institutions defending their interests in any dispute that may arise over unilateral trade 
measures. Top Chinese official in charge of climate issue and the Brazilian climate 
ambassador consider the WTO as the proper forum when developing countries are 
required to purchase emission allowances in the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade regime 
(Samuelsohn, 2007). This is reinforced in the Political Declaration of the Leaders of 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (the so-called G5) in Sapporo, Japan, July 
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8, 2008 that “in the negotiations under the Bali Road Map, we urge the international 
community to focus on the core climate change issues rather than inappropriate issues 
like competitiveness and trade protection measures which are being dealt with in other 
forums”. China may fear that the discussion on these no core issues will overshadow 
those core issues mandated under the Bali Action Plan (BAP). However, in my view, 
defining comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation within a climate 
regime is critical to addressing carbon tariffs of far-reaching implications. 
 
The BAP calls for “comparability of efforts” towards climate mitigation actions only 
among industrialized countries. However, lack of the clearly defined notion on what is 
comparable has led to diverse interpretations of the concept of comparability. Moreover, 
there is no equivalent language in the BAP to ensure that developing country actions, 
whatever might be agreed at Copenhagen, that must also be comparable to those of 
developed countries. So, some industrialized countries, if not all, have extended the scope 
of its application beyond industrialized countries themselves, and are considering the 
term “comparable” as the standard by which to assess the efforts made by all their trading 
partners in order to decide on whether to impose unilateral trade measures to address their 
own competitiveness concerns. Such lack of the common understanding will lead one 
country to define whether other countries have made comparative efforts to its own. This 
can hardly be objective, and in turn leads one country to misuse unilateral trade measures 
against other trading partners to address its own competitiveness concerns. 
 
This is not hypothetical. Rather, it is very real as the Lieberman-Warner bill in the U.S. 
Senate and the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S. House demonstrated. If such measures 
became law and were implemented, trading partners might choose to challenge U.S. 
before WTO. If a case like this really happens before a WTO panel, that panel would 
likely look to the UNFCCC for guidance on an appropriate standard for the comparability 
of climate efforts to assess whether that country has followed the international standard 
when determining comparability. Otherwise, that WTO panel will have no choice but to 
fall back on the aforementioned Shrimp-Turtle jurisprudence (see Box 2), and would be 
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influenced by the fear of the political fall out from overturning U.S. unilateral trade 
measures in its domestic climate legislation.  
 
If the U.S. measures were allowed to stand, not only China would suffer, but that would 
also undermine the UNFCCC’s legitimacy in setting and distributing climate 
commitments between its parties (Werksman and Houser, 2008). Therefore, as strongly 
emphasized in my interview in New York Times (Reuters, 2009), rather than reliance 
completely on WTO, there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable 
efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade 
measures at the international level, taking into account differences in their national 
circumstances, such as current level of development, per capita GDP, current and 
historical emissions, emission intensity, and per capita emissions. If well defined, that 
will provide some reference to WTO panels in examining cases related to comparability 
issues. 
  
Indeed, defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage. China 
has repeatedly emphasized that it has taken many climate mitigation efforts. No country 
denies that, but at most China has received cheap appreciation of its abatement efforts. 
Being praised for such efforts, China is urged to do “a lot more” (Doyle, 2009). However, 
if the comparability of climate efforts is defined, then many abatement efforts that China 
have been taking can be converted into the corresponding equivalent carbon allowance 
prices under the European Union and proposed U.S. emissions trading schemes. If such 
an equivalent is higher than prevailing U.S. allowance price, there is no rationale for the 
U.S. to impose carbon tariffs on Chinese products. If it is lower, then the level of carbon 
tariffs is only a differential between such an equivalent and prevailing U.S. allowance 
price.  
 
Take export tariffs that China applied on its own as a case in point. During 2006-08, the 
Chinese government levied, on its own, export taxes on a variety of energy and resource 
intensive products to discourage exports of those products that rely heavily on energy and 
resources and to save scarce energy and resources (Zhang, 2008). Given the fact that 
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China is a price setter in world aluminum, cement, iron and steel markets, its export 
policies have a significant effect on world prices and thus on EU competitiveness (Dröge 
et al., 2009). From the point of view of leveling the carbon cost playing field, such export 
taxes increase the price at which energy-intensive products made in China, such as steel 
and aluminum, are traded in world markets. For the EU and U.S. producers, such export 
taxes imposed by their major trading partner on these products take out at least part, if not 
all, of the competitive pressure that is at the heart of the carbon leakage debates. Being 
converted into the implicit carbon costs, the average export tariffs of 10-15% applied in 
China on its own during 2006-08 are estimated to be equivalent to a EU allowance price 
of 30-43 €/tCO2 for steel and of 18-26 €/tCO2 for aluminium (Wang and Voituriez, 2009). 
The estimated levels of CO2 price embedded in Chinese export taxes on steel and 
aluminium are very much in the same range as the average price of the EU allowances 
over the same period. Moreover, carbon tariffs impact disproportionally on energy-
intensive manufacturing. Manufacturing contributes to 33% of China’s GDP relative to 
the corresponding 16% for India, and China’s GDP is 3.5-4.0 times that of India. This 
suggests that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7-8 times 
that of India. Clearly, carbon tariffs impact much more on China than on India. This 
raises the issue of whether China should hold the same stance on this issue as India as it 
does now, although the two largest developing countries have taken and should continue 
to take the same positions on developed country obligations of ambitious emissions 
reductions, adequate technology transfer and financing in international climate change 
negotiations.    
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
With countries from around the world set to meet in Copenhagen in December 2009 to 
try to hammer out a post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a 
U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact. 
However, despite U.S. president Obama’s recent announcement that he will push for a 
commitment to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is 
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questionable whether U.S. Congress will agree to specific emissions cuts, although are 
not ambitious at all from the perspectives of both the EU and developing countries, 
without imposing carbon tariffs on Chinese products to the U.S. market, even given 
China’s own recent announcement that it will voluntarily seek to reduce its carbon 
intensity by 40-45% over the same period. 
 
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, 
which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates: 2020 and 2050. 
However, with the commitment period only up to 2020, there is a very little room left, 
say for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from each other. 
Meanwhile, taking on something for 2050 seems too far away for politicians. In my view, 
if the commitment period is extended to 2030, it would really open the possibility for the 
U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other side. By 2030, 
the U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission cuts as China and developing 
countries have demanded, while, as argued in this paper, China would have approached 
the threshold to take on the absolute emission cap that the U.S. and other industrialized 
countries have long asked for. Being aware of his proposed provisional target in 2020 
well below what is internationally expected from the U.S., president Obama announced a 
provisional target of a 42% reduction below 2005 in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. 
continuing commitments and leadership to find a global solution to the threat of climate 
change. While the U.S. proposed level of emission reductions for 2030 is still not 
ambitious enough, president Obama inadvertently points out the right direction of 
international climate negotiations. They need to look at the targeted date of 2030. If 
international negotiations could lead to much deeper emission cuts for developed 
countries as well as the absolute emission caps for major developing countries in 2030, 
that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs and, if 
implemented, their prospect for withstanding a challenge before WTO. 
  
However, if the international climate change negotiations continue their current course, 
the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures then seems essential to secure 
passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the joint 
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WTO-UNEP report indicates that border carbon adjustment measures might be allowed 
under the existing WTO rules, depending on specific design features (WTO and UNEP, 
2009).  Thus, on the U.S. side, in designing such trade measures, WTO rules need to be 
carefully scrutinised, and efforts need to be made early on to ensure that the proposed 
measures comply with them. After all, a conflict between the trade and climate regimes, 
if it breaks out, helps neither trade nor the global climate. The U.S. needs to explore with 
its trading partners cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon 
technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at an international level. 
Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-
Markey type of border adjustment provision, 1) there should be a period of good faith 
efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade 
measures; 2) WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to trade provisions 
that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or 
less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions can refer to 
the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but should allow importers to 
submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to 
cover the carbon contents of imported products.  
 
Being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to creditably 
indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the 
legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs. Being seen with greater capacity, 
capability and responsibility, China is facing great pressure both inside and outside 
international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition. As long as China does not 
signal well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps, it will always face the 
threats of trade measures. In responses to these concerns and to put China in a positive 
position, the paper proposes that China take as its negotiation position for Copenhagen 
and beyond requiring greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries to be cut at 
least by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels and per capita emissions for all 
countries by 2050 no more than the world’s average at that time. Moreover, it would be 
in China’s own best interest if, at a right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is 
going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from Copenhagen or later), 
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China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the 
year 2030.  
 
However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch 
from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through 
several intermediate phases. Assuming the commitment period of five years as the Kyoto 
Protocol has adopted, the paper envisions that China needs the following three 
transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions 
caps starting 2028 that will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 
2050: First, further credible energy-conservation commitments starting 2013; Second, 
voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity 
targets as its international commitment starting 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced 
reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing 
responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions as the living of standards increases 
over time. 
 
Meanwhile, China should make the best use of the forums provided under the UNFCCC 
and its KP to effectively deal with the proposed measures. The paper argues that there is 
a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate 
mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the 
international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that China applied on its own during 
2006-08, the paper shows that defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to 
China’s advantage. Furthermore, carbon tariffs impact disproportionally on energy-
intensive manufacturing. Given the fact that, in volume terms, energy-intensive 
manufacturing in China values 7-8 times that of India, carbon tariffs clearly impact much 
more on China than on India. This raises the issue of whether China should hold the same 
stance on this issue as India as it does now.   
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment 
provision holds out more sticks than carrots to developing countries. If the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries really want to persuade developing countries to do more to 
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combat climate change, they should first reflect why developing countries are unwilling 
to and cannot afford to go beyond the aforementioned third option in the first place. That 
will require industrialized countries to seriously consider developing countries’ legitimate 
demand that industrialized countries need to demonstrate that they have taken the lead in 
reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions, provide significant funding to support 
developing country’s climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to transfer 
low- or zero-carbon emission technologies at an affordable price to developing countries. 
Industrialized countries need to provide positive incentives to encourage developing 
countries to do more. Carrots should serve as the main means. Sticks can be incorporated, 
but only if they are credible and realistic and serve as a useful supplement to push 
developing countries to take actions or adopt policies and measures earlier than would 
otherwise have been the case. At a time when the world community is negotiating a post-
2012 climate regime, unrealistic border adjustment measures as exemplified in the 
Waxman-Markey bill are counterproductive to help to reach such an agreement on 
comparable climate actions in the post-2012 climate negotiations.  
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